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Abstract
This paper deals with the modeling of social competition, possibly resulting in the onset
of extreme conflicts. More precisely, we discuss models describing the interplay between indi-
vidual competition for wealth distribution that, when coupled with political stances coming
from support or opposition to a government, may give rise to strongly self-enhanced effects.
The latter may be thought of as the early stages of massive, unpredictable events known
as Black Swans, although no analysis of any fully-developed Black Swan is provided here.
Our approach makes use of the framework of the kinetic theory for active particles, where
nonlinear interactions among subjects are modeled according to game-theoretical tools.
Keywords: active particles, stochastic games, social conflicts, irrational behaviors, large
deviations
1 Introduction
The dynamics of social and economic systems are necessarily based on individual behaviors, by
which single subjects express, either consciously or unconsciously, a particular strategy, which is
heterogeneously distributed. The latter is often based not only on their own individual purposes,
but also on those they attribute to other agents. However, the sheer complexity of such systems
makes it often difficult to ascertain the impact of personal decisions on the resulting collective
dynamics. In particular, interactions among individuals need not have an additive, linear char-
acter. As a consequence, the global impact of a given number of entities (“field entities”) over a
single one (“test entity”) cannot be assumed to merely consist in the linear superposition of any
single field entity action. This nonlinear feature represents a serious conceptual difficulty to the
derivation, and subsequent analysis, of mathematical models for that type of systems.
In the last few years, a radical philosophical change has been undertaken in social and economic
disciplines. An interplay among Economics, Psychology, and Sociology has taken place, thanks
to a new cognitive approach no longer grounded on the traditional assumption of rational socio-
economic behavior. Starting from the concept of bounded rationality [40], the idea of Economics as
a subject highly affected by individual (rational or irrational) behaviors, reactions, and interactions
has begun to impose itself. In this frame, the contribution of mathematical methods to a deeper
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understanding of the relationships between individual behaviors and collective outcomes may be
fundamental. All of these concepts are expressed in the PhD dissertation [5], that the interested
reader is referred to also for additional pertinent bibliography.
More in general in fields ranging from Economics to Sociology and Ecology, the last decades
have witnessed an increasing interest for the introduction of quantitative mathematical methods
that could account for individual, not necessarily rational, behaviors. Terms as game theory,
bounded rationality, evolutionary dynamics are often used in that context and clearly illustrate
the continuous search for techniques able to provide mathematical models than can describe,
and predict, living behaviors, see [24, 25, 41, 42, 43], as also documented in the bibliography on
evolutionary game theory cited in the following. As a result, a picture of social and biological
sciences as evolutionary complex systems is unfolding [11, 20]. A key experimental feature of such
systems is that interaction among heterogeneous individuals often produces unexpected outcomes,
which were absent at the individual level, and are commonly termed emergent behaviors.
The new point of view promoted the image of Economics as an evolving complex system,
where interactions among heterogeneous individuals produce unpredictable emerging outcomes
[12, 32]. In this context, setting up a mathematical description able to capture the evolving
features of socio-economic systems is a challenging, however difficult, task, which calls for a proper
interaction between mathematics and social sciences. In this paper, a preliminary step in this
direction is attempted. A mathematical framework is outlined, suitable to incorporate some of
the main complexity features of socio-economic systems. Out of it, specific mathematical models
are derived, focusing in particular on the prediction of the so called Black Swan. The latter is
defined to be a rare event, showing up as an irrational collective trend generated by possibly
rational individual behaviors [44, 45].
To achieve our goal, we will use mathematical tools based on a development of the kinetic
theory for active particles, see e.g., [10, 17, 18], suitable to include nonlinear interactions and
learning phenomena. The hallmarks of the approach can be summarized as follows: the system
is partitioned into functional subsystems, whose entities, called active particles, are characterized
by an individual state termed activity; the state of each functional subsystem is defined by a
probability distribution over the activity variable; interactions among active particles, generally
nonlocal and nonlinearly additive, are treated as stochastic games, meaning that the pre-interaction
states of the particles and the post-interaction ones can be known only in probability; finally, the
evolution of the probability distribution is obtained by a balance of particles within elementary
volumes of the space of microscopic states, the inflow and outflow of particles being related to
the aforementioned interactions. A general theory for linearly additive interactions, along with
various applications, is reported in [16], whereas a first extension to non-additive and nonlocal
interactions, modeled by methods of the stochastic game theory, is included in [19].
This mathematical approach has been applied to various fields of Life Sciences, such as social
systems [21], opinion formation [22], and has been revisited in [6, 7] with reference to Behavioral
Sciences including Politics and Economics. Moreover, it has also been applied in fields different
from the above-mentioned ones, for instance propagation of epidemics under virus mutations
[27, 28] and theory of evolution [18]. In all of these applications, the heterogeneous behavior
of individuals and random mutations are important features characterizing the systems under
consideration. The conceptual link between methods of statistical mechanics and game theory
was also introduced by Helbing [31]; on the other hand, also methods of the mean-field kinetic
theory have been used to model socio-economic systems, see e.g., [29, 46]. The specialized literature
offers a great variety of different approaches, such as population dynamics with structure [48] or
super-macroscopic dynamical systems [35]. In all cases, the challenging goal to be met consists in
capturing the relevant features of living complex systems.
After the above general overview, the plan of the paper can now be illustrated in more detail.
The contents are distributed into four more sections. Section 2 analyzes the complexity aspects
of socio-economic systems, in particular five key features are selected to be retained in the mod-
eling approach. Section 3 introduces the mathematical structures of the kinetic theory for active
particles, which offer the basis for the derivation of specific models. Section 4 opens with two
illustrative applications focused on social conflicts: the first one shows that a social competition,
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if not properly controlled, may induce an unbalanced distribution of wealth with a clustering of
the population in two extreme classes (a large class of poor people and a small oligarchic class of
wealthy ones); the second one exemplifies, in connection with the aforesaid dynamics, how such a
clustering can lead to a growing opposition against a government. Subsequently, the investigation
moves on the identification of premonitory signals, that can provide preliminary insights into the
emergence of a Black Swan viewed as a large deviation from some heuristically expected trend.
Section 5 finally proposes a critical analysis and focuses on research perspectives.
2 Complexity aspects of socio-economic systems
In this section the complexity features of socio-economic systems are analyzed, with the aim of
extracting some hallmarks to be included in mathematical models.
Socio-economic systems can be described as ensembles of several living entities, viz. active
particles, whose individual behaviors simultaneously affect and are affected by the behaviors of
a certain number of other particles. These actions depend, in most cases, on the number of
interacting particles, their localization, and their state. Generally, individual actions are rational,
focused on a well-defined goal, and aimed at individual benefit. On the other hand, some particular
situations may give rise to behaviors in contrast with that primary goal, like e.g., in case of panic.
A further aspect to be considered is that the system is generally composed by parts, which are
interconnected and interdependent. Namely, every system is formed by nested subsystems, so that
interactions occur both within and among subsystems.
As a matter of fact, all living systems exhibit some common features, whereas others can vary
depending on the type of system under consideration. We will assume that all subsystems of a
given system are characterized by the same features, possibly expressed with larger or smaller
intensity according to their specificity.
Bearing all above in mind, in the following some specific aspects of socio-economic systems,
understood as living complex systems, are identified and commented. The selection is limited to
five features, in order to avoid an over-proliferation of concepts, considering that mathematical
equations cannot include the whole variety of complexity issues. Thus, the list below does not
claim to be exhaustive, rather it is generated by the authors’ personal experience and bias.
1. Emerging collective behaviors. Starting from basic individual choices, interaction dy-
namics produce the spontaneous emergence of collective behaviors, that, in most cases, are
completely different or apparently not contained in those of the single active particles. Ul-
timately, the whole can be much more than the sum of its parts. This is possible because
active particles typically operate out of equilibrium.
2. Strategy, heterogeneity, and stochastic games. Active particles have the ability to
develop specific strategies, which depend also on those expressed by the other particles.
Normally, such strategies are generated by rational principles but are heterogeneously dis-
tributed among the particles. Furthermore, irrational behaviors cannot be excluded. Ac-
cordingly, the representation of the system needs random variables, and interactions have
to be modeled in terms of stochastic games because it is not possible to identify an average
homogeneous rational attitude.
3. Nonlinear and nonlocal interactions. Interactions among active particles are generally
nonlinear and nonlocal, because they depend on the global distribution of some close and/or
far neighbors. The latter have to be identified in terms of a suitable distance among the
microscopic states of the particles. Active particles play a game at each interaction: the
outcome, which depends nonlinearly on the states of all interacting particles, modifies their
state in a stochastic manner.
4. Learning and evolution. Individuals in socio-economic systems are able to learn from their
experience. This implies that the expression of the strategy evolves in time, and consequently
that interaction dynamics undergo modifications. In some cases, special situations (e.g.,
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onset of panic) can even induce quick modifications. Moreover, adaptation to environmental
conditions and search of one’s own benefit may induce mutations and evolution.
5. Large number of components. Living systems are often constituted by a great deal of
individual diversity, such that a detailed description focused on single active particles would
be actually infeasible. Therefore, a complexity reduction, by means of suitable mathematical
strategies, is necessary for handling them at a practical level.
3 Complexity reduction and mathematical tools
This section provides the conceptual lines leading to the methods of the kinetic theory for active
particles, which has been selected as the mathematical framework suitable to derive specific models
here. The presentation is followed by a critical analysis aimed at checking the consistency of the
mathematical approach with the issues discussed in Section 2, as well as its efficiency in reducing
the complexity of the real system. Modeling is concerned with systems of interacting individuals
belonging to different groups. Their number is supposed to be constant in time, namely birth and
death processes or inlets from an outer environment are not taken into account.
It is worth stressing that the approach used in the various papers cited in the Introduction was
based on linearly additive interactions with parameters constant in time. Here, on the contrary,
both nonlinearly additive interactions and time-evolving parameters, due to the conditioning by
the collective state of the system, are considered. We recall that interactions are said to be linearly
additive when the outcome of each of them is not influenced by the presence of particles other
than the interacting ones, so that a superposition principle holds true: the action on a particle
is the sum of all actions applied individually by the other particles. For instance, this is the
case of mean field theories. Otherwise, interactions are said to be nonlinearly additive. We point
out that the progress from linear to nonlinear interactions is crucial in the attempt of inserting
into mathematical equations individual behaviors that may change quickly, possibly under the
influence of the outer environment. Nonlinearities can be generated in several ways. In particular,
the particles which play a role in the interactions may be selected by means of rational actions,
whereas the interaction output can be obtained from individual strategies and interpretation of
actions exerted vby other particles. These concepts are well understood in the interpretation of
swarming phenomena from the point of view of both Physics [13] and Mathematics [19, 20, 26].
3.1 Active particles, heterogeneity, functional subsystems, and repre-
sentation issues
As already stated, the living entities of the system at hand will be regarded as particles able to
express actively a certain social and/or economic strategy based on their socio-economic state.
Such a strategy will be called activity. In general, the system might be constituted by different
types of active particles, each of them featuring a different strategy. However, aiming at a (neces-
sary) complexity reduction, the system can be decomposed in functional subsystems constituted
by active particles that individually express the same strategy. In other words, whenever the
strategy of the active particles of a system is heterogeneous, the modeling approach should iden-
tify an appropriate decomposition into functional subsystems, within each of which the strategy
is instead homogeneous across the member active particles.
In each functional subsystem, the microscopic activity, denoted by u, can be taken as a scalar
variable belonging to a domain Du ⊆ R. In some cases, it may be convenient to assume that Du
coincides with the whole R.
Let us consider a decomposition of the original system into m ≥ 1 functional subsystems
labeled by an index p = 1, . . . , m. According to the kinetic theory for active particles, each of
them is described by a time-evolving distribution function over the microscopic activity u:
fp = fp(t, u) : [0, Tmax]×Du → R+,
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Tmax > 0 being a certain final time (possibly +∞), such that the quantity f
p(t, u) du is the (in-
finitesimal) number of active particles of the p-th subsystem having at time t an activity comprised
in the (infinitesimal) interval [u, u+ du].
Under suitable integrability conditions, the number of active particles in the p-th functional
subsystem at time t is
Np(t) :=
∫
Du
fp(t, u) du.
More in general, it is possible to define (weighted) moments of any order l of the distribution
functions1:
E
p
l (t) :=
∫
Du
ulfp(t, u)w(u) du,
where w : Du → R+ is an appropriate weight function with unit integral on Du. E
p
l (t) can be
either finite or infinite, according to the integrability properties of fp(t, ·).
If the number of particles within each subsystem is constant in time, so that no particle
transition occurs among subsystems, then each fp can be normalized with respect to Np(0) and
understood as a probability density. Alternatively, it is possible to normalize with respect to the
total number of particles of the system
∑m
p=1N
p(0), which entails
m∑
p=1
∫
Du
fp(t, u) du = 1, ∀ t ∈ [0, Tmax].
It has been shown in [22], see also the references cited therein, that for various applications
it is convenient to assume that the activity is a discrete variable, especially when activity classes
can be more readily identified in the real system. A lattice Iu = {u1, . . . , ui, . . . , un} is thus
introduced in the domain Du, admitting that u ∈ Iu. The representation of the p-th functional
subsystem is now provided by a set of n ≥ 1 distribution functions
f
p
i = f
p
i (t) : [0, Tmax]→ R+, i = 1, . . . , n
such that fpi (t) is the (possibly normalized) number of active particles in the i-th activity class of
the p-th subsystem at time t. Formally, we have fpi (t) = f
p(t, ui) or, in distributional sense,
fp(t, u) =
n∑
i=1
f
p
i (t)δui(u),
where δui is the Dirac distribution centered at ui . The formulas given above for the moments of
the distribution remain valid, provided integrals on Du are correctly understood as discrete sums
over i:
Np(t) =
n∑
i=1
f
p
i (t), E
p
l (t) =
n∑
i=1
ulif
p
i (t)w(ui). (1)
3.2 Interactions, stochastic games, and collective dynamics
In general, interactions involve particles of both the same and different functional subsystems.
In some cases, interactions between active particles and the outer environment have also to be
taken into account. The outer environment is typically assumed to have a known state, which is
not modified by interactions with the system at hand. In particular, in this paper we consider
the simple case of systems which do not interact with the outer environment, besides possibly an
action applied by the latter that modifies some interaction rules.
The description of the interactions can essentially be of the following two types: deterministic
if the output is univocally identified given the states of the interacting entities (generally related
1Notice that, in this formula, l is a true exponent whereas p is a superscript.
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to standard rational behavior of the particles, when large deviations are not expected); stochastic
if the output can be known only in probability, due for instance to a variability in the reactions
of the particles to similar conditions. In the latter case, interactions are understood as stochastic
games. In the present context, our interest is mainly in stochastic games because of possible
irrational behaviors, as outlined in Section 2.
When describing interactions among active particles, it is useful to distinguish three main
actors named test, candidate, and field particles. This terminology is indeed standard in the
kinetic theory for active particles.
• The test particle, with activity u, is a generic representative entity of the functional sub-
system under consideration. Studying interactions within and among subsystems means
studying how the test particle can loose its state or other particles can gain it.
• Candidate particles, with activity u∗, are the particles which can gain the test state u in
consequence of the interactions.
• Field particles, with activity u∗, are the particles whose presence triggers the interactions
of the candidate particles.
The modeling of the interactions is based on the derivation of two terms: the interaction rate
and the transition probabilities. Let us consider, separately, some preliminary guidelines for their
construction.
Interaction rate This term, denoted by ηpq, models the frequency of the interactions between
candidate and field particles belonging to the p-th and q-th functional subsystems, respectively.
Transition probabilities The general rule to be followed in modeling stochastic games is that
candidate particles can acquire, in probability, the state of the test particle after an interaction with
field particles, while the test particle can lose, in probability, its own. Such dynamics are described
by the transition probabilities Bpq, which express the probability that a candidate particle of the
p-th subsystem ends up into the state of the test particle (of the same subsystem) after interacting
with a field particle of the q-th subsystem.
In case of linear interactions, Bpq is conditioned only by the states of the interacting particles
for each pair of functional subsystems: Bpq = Bpq(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗). In addition, it satisfies the
following condition:∫
Du
Bpq(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗) du = 1, ∀u∗, u
∗ ∈ Du, ∀ p, q = 1, . . . , m, (2)
which, in case of discrete activity, becomes
n∑
i=1
Bpqhk(i) = 1, ∀h, k = 1, . . . , n, ∀ p, q = 1, . . . , m, (3)
where we have denoted Bpqhk(i) := B
pq(uh → ui|uh, uk).
Nonlinear interactions imply, instead, that particles are not simply subject to the superposition
of binary actions but are also affected by the global current state of the system. Consequently, Bpq
may be conditioned by the moments of the distribution functions. Denoting by EpL = {E
p
l }
L
l=1 the
set of all moments of the distribution function fp up to some order L ≥ 0, the formal expression
of the transition probabilities is now Bpq = Bpq(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗; EpL, E
q
L), along with a condition
analogous to that expressed by Eq. (2). In case of discrete activity, rather than introducing a
new notation we simply redefine Bpqhk(i) := B
pq(uh → ui|uh, uk; E
p
L, E
q
L), so as to avoid an over-
proliferation of symbols.
The above models of interactions lead straightforwardly to the derivation of a system of evolu-
tion equations for the set of distribution functions {fp}mp=1, obtained from a balance of incoming
6
and outgoing fluxes in the elementary volume [u, u + du] of the space of microscopic states. The
resulting mathematical structure, to be used as a paradigm for the derivation of specific models,
is as follows:
∂fp
∂t
(t, u) =
m∑
q=1
∫∫
D2
u
ηpq(t, u∗, u
∗)Bpq(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗; EpL, E
q
L)f
p(t, u∗)f
q(t, u∗) du∗ du
∗
− fp(t, u)
m∑
q=1
∫
Du
ηpq(t, u, u∗)f q(t, u∗) du∗, p = 1, . . . , m, (4)
which, in case of discrete activity, formally modifies as
df
p
i
dt
(t) =
m∑
q=1
n∑
k=1
n∑
h=1
η
pq
hk(t)B
pq
hk(i)f
p
h(t)f
q
k (t)− f
p
i (t)
m∑
q=1
n∑
k=1
η
pq
ik (t)f
q
k (t) (5)
for i = 1, . . . , n and p = 1, . . . , m.
3.3 Interactions with transitions across functional subsystems
The mathematical framework presented in the preceding section does not account for changes
of functional subsystem by the active particles. However, transitions across subsystems may
be relevant in modeling concomitant social and economic dynamics, particularly if the various
subsystems can be related to different aspects of the microscopic state of the active particles.
To be more specific, and to anticipate the application that we will be concerned with in the
next sections, consider the case of a vector activity variable u = (u, v) ∈ Du ×Dv ⊆ R
2, with u
representing the economic state of the active particles of a certain country and v their level of sup-
port/opposition to the government policy. In order to reduce the complexity of the system, we will
assume that the component v of the microscopic state is discrete: v ∈ Iv = {v1, . . . , vp, . . . , vm} ⊂
Dv, and we will use the lattice Iv as a criterion for identifying the functional subsystems. In prac-
tice, each subsystem gathers individuals expressing a common opinion on the government’s doings.
It is plain that, in order to obtain an accurate picture of the interconnected socio-economic dy-
namics, besides economic interactions within and among subsystems, transitions of active particles
across the latter have also to be considered.
To this end, the mathematical structures previously derived need to be duly generalized. Specif-
ically, the transition probabilities read now
Bpq(r) = Bpq(r)(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗; EpL, E
q
L, E
r
L), u, u∗, u
∗ ∈ Du, p, q, r = 1, . . . , m
for expressing the probability that a candidate particle of the p-th subsystem with activity u∗
ends up into the r-th subsystem with activity u after an interaction with a field particle of the
q-th subsystem with activity u∗. Notice that, in case of nonlinearly additive interactions, these
probabilities are generally conditioned also by the moments of the distribution functions of the
output subsystem. The new transition probabilities satisfy the normalization condition:
m∑
r=1
∫
Du
Bpq(r)(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗; EpL, E
q
L, E
r
L) du = 1, ∀u∗, u
∗ ∈ Du, p, q = 1, . . . , m.
Following the same guidelines that led to the derivation of the mathematical structures of
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Section 3.2, we obtain the new equations with transitions across subsystems as
∂f r
∂t
(t, u) =
m∑
p=1
m∑
q=1
∫∫
D2
u
ηpq(t, u∗, u
∗)Bpq(r)(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗; EpL, E
q
L, E
r
L)
× fp(t, u∗)f
q(t, u∗) du∗ du
∗
− f r(t, u)
m∑
q=1
∫
Du
ηrq(t, u, u∗)f q(t, u∗) du∗, r = 1, . . . , m. (6)
It is worth noticing that by putting
Bpq(r)(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗; EpL, E
q
L, E
r
L) = B
pq(u∗ → u|u∗, u
∗; EpL, E
q
L)δpr,
where δpr = 1 if p = r, δpr = 0 otherwise, one recovers from Eq. (6) the particular case of
interactions without transitions across subsystems described by Eq. (4).
Models relying on Eq. (6) are hybrid, because the economic state u is treated as a continuous
variable whereas the decomposition in functional subsystem, linked to socio-political beliefs, is of
a discrete nature. Correspondingly, the space of microscopic states is Du× Iv. If also the variable
u is discrete within each subsystem then the space of microscopic states is the full lattice Iu × Iv
and Eq. (6) reads
df ri
dt
(t) =
m∑
p=1
m∑
q=1
n∑
k=1
n∑
h=1
η
pq
hk(t)B
pq
hk(i, r)f
p
h(t)f
q
k (t)
− f ri (t)
m∑
q=1
n∑
k=1
η
rq
ik (t)f
q
k (t), i = 1, . . . , n, r = 1, . . . , m, (7)
where Bpqhk(i, r) := B
pq(r)(uh → ui|uh, uk; E
p
L, E
q
L, E
r
L) fulfills
m∑
r=1
n∑
i=1
Bpqhk(i, r) = 1, ∀h, k = 1, . . . , n, ∀ p, q = 1, . . . , m.
Equation (7) is a generalization of Eq. (5), which is recovered as a particular case by letting
Bpqhk(i, r) = B
pq
hk(i)δpr.
4 On the interplay between socio-economic dynamics and
political conflicts
The theory developed in the previous sections provides a background for tackling some illustrative
applications concerned with social competition problems. Particularly, our main interest here lies
in phenomena such as unbalanced wealth distributions possibly leading to popular rebellion against
governments, which can be classified as Black Swans. The envisaged scenario shares some analogies
with the events recently observed in North Africa countries, though in a simplified context. The
mathematical models, indeed, are going to be some minimal exploratory ones, with a small number
of functional subsystems and parameters for describing interactions at the microscopic scale.
We focus on closed systems, such as a country with no interactions with other countries featur-
ing similar political and/or religious organizations. A natural goal to pursue is then understanding
which kind of interactions among different socio-economic classes of the same country can produce
the aforesaid Black Swans. It is worth mentioning that, when interactions with other countries
are considered, the investigation can also address propagation by a domino effect.
The contents of the following subsections organize the previous ideas through three steps.
The first one refers to welfare dynamics in terms of cooperation and competition among economic
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classes. The second one focuses instead on dynamics of support and opposition to a certain regime
triggered by the welfare distribution. Finally, the third one proposes a preliminary approach to the
identification of premonitory signals possibly implying the onset of a Black Swan, here understood
as an exceptional growth of opposition to the regime fostered by the synergy with socio-economics
dynamics.
In order to model the above-mentioned cooperation/competition interactions, we adopt the
following qualitative paradigm of consensus/dissensus dynamics:
• Consensus – The candidate particle sees its state either increased, by profiting from a field
particle with a higher state, or decreased, by pandering to a field particle with a lower
state. After mutual interaction, the states of the particles become closer than before the
interaction.
• Dissensus – The candidate particle sees its state either further decreased, by facing a field
particle with a higher state, or further increased, by facing a field particle with a lower
state. After mutual interaction, the states of the particles become farther than before the
interaction.
Once formalized at a quantitative level, this paradigm can act as a base for constructing the
transition probabilities introduced in Section 3.
Remark 1. Although the modeling of the transition probabilities relates to the microscopic inter-
actions among active particles, it is worth mentioning that recent contributions to game theory,
especially the approach to evolutionary games presented in [30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38], address inter-
actions at the macroscopic scale. In such a context, learning abilities and evolution are essential
features of the modeling strategy, while changes in the external environment can induce modifica-
tions of rational behaviors up to irrational ones.
4.1 Modeling socio-economic competition
In this section we consider the modeling of socio-economic interactions based on the previously
discussed consensus/dissensus dynamics. This problem has been first addressed in [21] for a
large community of individuals divided into different social classes. The model proposed by those
authors introduces a critical distance, which triggers either cooperation or competition among the
classes. In more detail, if the actual distance between the interacting classes is lower than the
critical one then a competition takes place, which causes a further enrichment of the wealthier
class and a further impoverishment of the poorer one. Conversely, if the actual distance is greater
than the critical one then the social organization forces cooperation, namely the richer class has
to contribute to the wealth of the poorer one.
In the above-cited paper, linearly additive interactions are used along with a constant critical
distance. Such an approach is here revisited by introducing nonlinearly additive interactions and
a critical distance which evolves in time depending on the global wealth distribution. In more
detail, the characteristics of the present framework are summarized as follows.
• Functional subsystems. A single functional subsystem (m = 1) is considered, constituted by
the population of a country or of a regional area. For the sake of convenience, in this case
we drop any superscript referring to functional subsystems (p, q, . . . ).
• Activity. The activity variable u identifies the wealth status of the active particles.
• Encounter rate. Two different rates of interactions are considered, corresponding to com-
petitive and cooperative interactions, respectively.
• Strategy leading to the transition probabilities. When interacting with other particles, each
active particle plays a game with stochastic output. If the difference of wealth class between
the interacting particles is lower than a critical distance γ then the particles compete in such
a way that those with higher wealth increase their state against those with lower wealth.
9
1 n
h kh - 1 k + 1
class distance ≤ γ
competition
1 n
h k - 1h + 1 k
class distance > γ
cooperation
Figure 1: Dynamics of competition (top) and cooperation (bottom) between pairs of candidate
(index h) and field (index k) active particles. The critical distance γ, which triggers either behavior
depending on the actual distance between the interacting classes, may evolve in time according to
the global evolution of the system.
Conversely, if the difference of wealth class is higher than γ then the opposite occurs (see
Fig. 1). The critical distance evolves in time according to the global wealth distribution over
wealthy and poor particles. It may be influenced, at least partially, by the social policy of
the government, to be regarded in the present application as an external action.
This modeling approach can be developed for both continuous and discrete activity variable.
The specific model proposed here is derived assuming that the activity is a discrete variable,
which, as observed in [23], allows one to identify the microscopic states of the population by
ranges, namely by a finite number n of classes u1, . . . , un. This is not only practical from the
technical point of view, but also more realistic for the description, in mathematical terms, of the
real-world system at hand. The reference mathematical structure is therefore Eq. (5), which we
rewrite adapting it to the present context:
dfi
dt
(t) =
n∑
k=1
n∑
h=1
ηhk(t)Bhk(i)fh(t)fk(t)− fi(t)
n∑
k=1
ηik(t)fk(t), i = 1, . . . , n. (8)
Among the possible choices, we select a uniformly spaced wealth grid in the interval Du = [−1, 1]
with odd n:
Iu = {u1 = −1, . . . , un+1
2
= 0, . . . , un = 1},
ui =
2
n− 1
i−
n+ 1
n− 1
, i = 1, . . . , n,
(9)
agreeing that ui < 0 identifies a poor class whereas ui > 0 a wealthy one.
We next assume that the encounter rate ηhk ≥ 0 is piecewise constant over the wealth classes:
ηhk =
{
η0 if |k − h| ≤ γ (competition),
µη0 if |k − h| > γ (cooperation),
(10)
where η0 > 0 is a constant to be hidden in the time scale and 0 < µ ≤ 1.
The transition probabilities Bhk(i) ∈ [0, 1] are required to satisfy condition (3), which
implies the conservation in time of the total number of active particles:
N(t) =
n∑
i=1
fi(t) = constant, ∀ t ≥ 0,
10
plus an additional condition ensuring the conservation of the average wealth status of the popu-
lation:
n∑
i=1
uifi(t) = constant, ∀ t ≥ 0. (11)
This means that the interaction dynamics cause globally neither production nor loss of wealth,
but simply its redistribution among the classes. We will denote by U0 the average wealth status
as fixed at the initial time:
U0 :=
n∑
i=1
uifi(0).
By computing on Eq. (8), it turns out that sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of (11) are:
• symmetric encounter rate, i.e., ηhk = ηkh, ∀h, k = 1, . . . , n;
• transition probabilities such that
n∑
i=1
uiBhk(i) = uh + σhk, ∀h, k = 1, . . . , n, (12)
where σhk is an antisymmetric tensor, i.e., σhk = −σkh, ∀h, k = 1, . . . , n.
Notice that the encounter rate (10) is indeed symmetric. In order to explain condition (12),
let us consider preliminarily the particular case σhk = 0 for all h, k. Then (12) reduces to∑n
i=1 uiBhk(i) = uh, which says that the expected wealth class of a candidate particle after an
interaction coincides with its class before the interaction. Namely, interactions do not cause,
in average, either enrichment or impoverishment, pretty much like a fair game. In the general
case, Eq. (12) allows for fluctuations of the expected post-interaction wealth classes, over the
pre-interaction one, however such that they globally balance:
∑n
h,k=1 σhk = 0.
A possible set of transition probabilities describing cooperation/competition dynamics accord-
ing to the distance between the interacting classes is, with minor modifications, that proposed in
[21]:
h = k
{
Bhh(h) = 1
Bhh(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h
h 6= k


|k − h| ≤ γ
(competition)


h = 1, n
{
Bhk(h) = 1
Bhk(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h
h 6= 1, n


h < k


k 6= n


Bhk(h− 1) = αhk
Bhk(h) = 1− αhk
Bhk(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h− 1, h
k = n
{
Bhn(h) = 1
Bhn(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h
h > k


k 6= 1


Bhk(h) = 1− αhk
Bhk(h+ 1) = αhk
Bhk(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h, h+ 1
k = 1
{
Bh1(h) = 1
Bh1(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h
|k − h| > γ
(cooperation)


h < k


Bhk(h) = 1− αhk
Bhk(h+ 1) = αhk
Bhk(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h, h+ 1
h > k


Bhk(h− 1) = αhk
Bhk(h) = 1− αhk
Bhk(i) = 0 ∀ i 6= h− 1, h,
(13)
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where it is assumed that interactions within the same class produce no effect.
The parameter αhk ∈ [0, 1] appearing in Eq. (13) has the following meaning:
• in case of competition, it is the probability that the candidate particle further increases or
decreases its wealth if it is, respectively, richer or poorer than the field particle;
• in case of cooperation, it is the probability that the candidate particle gains or transfers part
of its wealth if it is, respectively, poorer or richer than the field particle.
This probability may be constant, like in the already cited work [21], or, as we will assume
throughout the remaining part of this paper, may depend on the wealth classes, e.g.,
αhk =
|k − h|
n− 1
, (14)
in such a way that the larger the distance between the interacting classes the more stressed the
effect of cooperation or competition. Any proportionality constant can be transferred into a scaling
of the time variable.
It can be checked, using Eq. (13), that
n∑
i=1
uiBhk(i) = uh + ǫhkαhk∆u,
where ∆u = 2
n−1
is the constant step of the grid (9) while ǫhk may be either −1, or 0, or 1
(depending on h, k) and is antisymmetric. Since αhk given by Eq. (14) is instead symmetric, the
previous one turns out to be precisely condition (12) with σhk = ǫhkαhk∆u, which guarantees that
this model preserves the average wealth status of the system.
Remark 2. For wealth conservation purposes, the transition probabilities (13) are such that the
extreme classes never take part nor trigger social competition. Namely, a candidate particle in
the class h = 1 or h = n can only stay in the same class after any interaction with whatever field
particle. Correspondingly, a field particle in the class k = 1 or k = n can only cause a candidate
particle to remain in its pre-interaction class, no matter what the latter is.
The critical distance γ, taken constant in [21], is here assumed to depend on the instanta-
neous distribution of the active particles over the wealth classes, in order to account for nonlinearly
additive interactions. In more detail, the time evolution of γ should translate the following phe-
nomenology of (uncontrolled) social competition:
• in general, γ grows with the number of poor active particles, thus causing larger and larger
gaps of social competition. Few wealthy active particles insist on maintaining, and possibly
improving, their benefits;
• in a population constituted almost exclusively by poor active particles γ attains a value
such that cooperation is inhibited, for individuals tend to be involved in a “battle of the
have-nots”;
• conversely, in a population constituted almost exclusively by wealthy active particles γ at-
tains a value such that competition is inhibited, because individuals tend preferentially to
cooperate for preserving their common benefits.
Bearing these ideas in mind, we introduce the number of poor and wealthy active particles at
time t:
N−(t) =
n−1
2∑
i=1
fi(t), N
+(t) =
n∑
i=n+3
2
fi(t).
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Notice that, by excluding the middle class un+1
2
= 0 from both N− and N+, we implicitly regard
it as economically “neutral”. Up to normalization over the total number of active particles, we
have 0 ≤ N± ≤ 1 with also N− +N+ ≤ 1, hence the quantity
S := N− −N+,
which provides a macroscopic measure of the social gap in the population, is bounded between
−1 and 1. Given that, we now look for a quadratic polynomial dependence of γ on S taking
into account the following conditions, which bring to a quantitative level the previous qualitative
arguments:
• S = S0 ⇒ γ = γ0, where S0, γ0 are a reference social gap and the corresponding reference
critical distance, respectively;
• S = 1⇒ γ = n, which implies that when the population is composed by poor particles only
(N− = 1, N+ = 0) the socio-economic dynamics are of full competition;
• S = −1 ⇒ γ = 0, which implies that, conversely, when the population is composed by
wealthy particles only (N− = 0, N+ = 1) the socio-economic dynamics are of full coopera-
tion.
Considering further that only integer values of γ are meaningful, for so are the distances
between pairs of wealth classes, the resulting analytical expression of γ turns out to be
γ =
⌊
2γ0(S
2 − 1)− n(S0 + 1)(S
2 − S0)
2(S20 − 1)
+
n
2
S
⌋
, (15)
where ⌊·⌋ denotes integer part (floor). In particular, if the reference social gap is taken to be
S0 = 0 (i.e., when N
− = N+) then the expression of γ specializes as (see Fig. 2)
γ =
⌊
n− 2γ0
2
S2 +
n
2
S + γ0
⌋
. (16)
Remark 3. Both N− and N+ can be read, according to Eq. (1), as zeroth-order weighted moments
of the set of distribution functions {fi}
n
i=1, with respective weights
w(u) =
{
1 for u ∈ [−1, 0),
0 for u ∈ [0, 1],
and w(u) =
{
0 for u ∈ [−1, 0],
1 for u ∈ (0, 1].
Therefore, the dependence of γ on S introduces nonlinearly additive interactions in the transition
probabilities Bhk(i).
The evolution of the system predicted by the model depends essentially on the four parameters
n (the number of wealth classes), µ (the relative encounter rate for cooperation, cf. Eq. (10)), U0
(the average wealth of the population), and γ0 (the reference critical distance). The next simula-
tions aim at exploring some aspects of the role that they play on the asymptotic configurations of
the system. In more detail:
• n = 9 and µ = 0.3 are selected;
• two case studies for U0 are addressed, namely U0 = −0.4 < 0 and U0 = 0, in order to com-
pare, respectively, the economic dynamics of a society in which poor classes dominate with
those of a society in which the initial distribution of active particles encompasses uniformly
poor and rich classes;
• in addition, in each of the case studies above the asymptotic configurations for both constant
and variable γ are investigated, assuming, for duly comparison, that in the former the critical
distance coincides with γ0. Notice that a constant critical distance can be interpreted as an
13
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Figure 2: The critical distance γ vs. the macroscopic social gap S as in Eq. (16) for the two cases
γ0 = 3, 7 and n = 9 social classes. Empty bullets indicate the reference value γ0 corresponding to
the reference social gap S0 = 0. Filled bullets indicate instead the actual initial critical distance
γ(t = 0) corresponding to the actual initial social gap S(t = 0) for the case study addressed
in Fig. 3. Dotted lines, drawing the parabolic profile of function (16) without integer part, are
plotted for visual reference.
external control, for instance exerted by a Government, in order to supervise and regulate
the wealth redistribution. The specific value of γ can be related to more or less precautionary
policies, depending on the allowed level of socio-economic competition. Particularly, γ0 = 3,
corresponding to a mainly cooperative attitude, and γ0 = 7, corresponding instead to a
strongly competitive attitude, are chosen.
Figure 3 illustrates the asymptotic configurations in case of negative average wealth status U0
(poor society). The model predicts, in general, a consolidation of the poorest classes. Nevertheless,
in a basically cooperative framework (γ0 = 3) a certain redistribution of part of the wealth
is observed, which for controlled (viz. constant) γ involves moderately poor and moderately
rich classes whereas for uncontrolled (viz. variable) γ further stresses the difference between the
poorest and the wealthiest classes. In fact, imposing a constant critical distance coinciding with the
reference value γ0 corresponds to forcing the society to behave as if the social gap were S ≡ S0 = 0.
On the other hand, the spontaneous attitude of the modeled society, in which the actual initial
social gap computed from the given initial condition is S(t = 0) = 8
15
≈ 0.53 > 0, is much more
competitive than that implied by γ0 = 3, as Fig. 2 demonstrates. Analogous considerations can
be repeated in a competitive framework (γ0 = 7). Now the tendency is a strong concentration in
the extreme classes, which in particular results in the consolidation of oligarchic rich classes which
were nearly absent at the beginning.
Figure 4 illustrates instead the asymptotic trend in case of null average wealth status (econom-
ically “neutral” society). In this case there is no difference between the asymptotic configurations
reached under constant and variable γ. Indeed, the initial symmetry of the distribution about the
intermediate class u5 = 0, which ensures U0 = 0 and is preserved during the subsequent evolution,
forces S = 0, hence γ = γ0, at all later times. In other words, controlled and spontaneous behav-
iors of the population coincide. The stationary configurations show a quite intuitive progressive
clustering of the population in the extreme classes as the level of competition increases from γ0 = 3
to γ0 = 7.
As a general concluding remark, we notice that, even in a scenario of spontaneous/uncontrolled
socio-economic dynamics (variable critical distance), none of the asymptotic configurations of the
system seems to be properly identifiable as a Black Swan. On the other hand, the simple case
14
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Figure 3: Asymptotic distributions of active particles over wealth classes for U0 = −0.4.
studies addressed in this subsection are preliminary to the contents of the next subsection, which
will focus on the joint effect of socio-economic and political dynamics. It is from the complex
interplay between these two social aspects that Black Swans are mostly expected to arise.
4.2 Modeling support/opposition to a Government
In this section we investigate how the welfare dynamics considered in Section 4.1 can induce
changes of personal opinions in terms of support/opposition to a certain political regime. In
doing so, we will keep in mind recent results in the literature of Social Sciences; see for instance
[1, 2, 3, 4, 8].
The mathematical structures to be used are those presented in Section 3.3, in particular the
additional discrete microscopic variable v, which partitions the population into m functional sub-
systems, represents the attitude of the individuals to the government. It is customary to use also
for v the uniformly spaced lattice
Iv = {v1 = −1, . . . , vm+1
2
= 0, . . . , vm = 1},
vp =
2
m− 1
p−
m+ 1
m− 1
, p = 1, . . . , m,
agreeing that v1 = −1 corresponds to the strongest opposition whereas vm = 1 to the maximum
support.
Mathematical models based on Eq. (7) are obtained by prescribing the encounter rate ηpqhk and
the transition probabilities Bpqhk(i, r). A very simple approach is proposed here, deferring to the
15
γ0 = 3
γ0 = 7
U0 = 0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fu
n
ct
io
n
Wealth classes
initial condition
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fu
n
ct
io
n
Wealth classes
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fu
n
ct
io
n
Wealth classes
Figure 4: Asymptotic distributions of active particles over wealth classes for U0 = 0.
next section a discussion on possible improvements.
For the encounter rate the same model given by Eq. (10) is assumed, according to the
idea that encounters among active particle are mainly driven by the wealth state rather than by
the difference of political opinion. Thus ηpqhk is independent of the functional subsystems that
candidate and field particles belong to, ηpqhk = ηhk. Notice that this amounts to disregarding
political persuasion dynamics. The model could be made more precise, for instance, by allowing
the encounter rate to depend on the proximity of political point of view of the interacting particles.
For the transition probabilities the following factorization on the output test state (ui, vr)
is proposed, relying simply on intuition:
Bpqhk(i, r) = B¯
pq
hk(i)Bˆ
pq
hk(r),
where:
• B¯pqhk(i) encodes the transitions of wealth class, which are further supposed to be independent
of the political feelings of the interacting pairs: B¯pqhk(i) = B¯hk(i). For this term the structure
given by Eq. (13) is used;
• Bˆpqhk(r) encodes the changes of political opinion resulting from interactions. Coherently with
the observation made above that political persuasion is neglected, so that political feelings
originate in the individuals in consequence of their own wealth condition, this term is assumed
to depend on the economic and political state of the candidate particle only: Bˆpqhk(r) = Bˆ
p
h(r).
In view of the special structure
Bpqhk(i, r) = B¯hk(i)Bˆ
p
h(r),
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it turns out that sufficient conditions ensuring the conservation in time of both the total number
of active particles and the average wealth status of the system are:

n∑
i=1
B¯hk(i) = 1, ∀h, k = 1, . . . , n
n∑
i=1
uiB¯hk(i) = uh + σhk, ∀h, k = 1, . . . , n, σhk antisymmetric
m∑
r=1
Bˆph(r) = 1, ∀h = 1, . . . , n, ∀ p = 1, . . . , m;
in particular, the first two statements are directly borrowed from Eq. (13).
As far as the modeling of Bˆph(r) is concerned, the following set of transition probabilities is
proposed:
U0 < 0, uh < 0


p = 1
{
Bˆ1h(1) = 1
Bˆ1h(r) = 0 ∀ r 6= 1
p > 1


Bˆph(p− 1) = 2β
Bˆph(p) = 1− 2β
Bˆph(r) = 0 ∀ r 6= p− 1, p
U0 < 0, uh ≥ 0
or
U0 ≥ 0, uh < 0


p = 1


Bˆ1h(1) = 1− β
Bˆ1h(2) = β
Bˆ1h(r) = 0 ∀ r 6= 1, 2
1 < p < m


Bˆph(p− 1) = β
Bˆph(p) = 1− 2β
Bˆph(p+ 1) = β
Bˆph(r) = 0 ∀ r 6= p− 1, p, p+ 1
p = m


Bˆmh (m− 1) = β
Bˆmh (m) = 1− β
Bˆmh (r) = 0 ∀ r 6= m− 1, m
(17)
U0 ≥ 0, uh ≥ 0


p < m


Bˆph(p) = 1− 2β
Bˆph(p+ 1) = 2β
Bˆph(r) = 0 ∀ r 6= p, p+ 1
p = m
{
Bˆmh (m) = 1
Bˆmh (r) = 0 ∀ r 6= m,
where β ∈ [0, 1
2
] is a parameter expressing the basic probability of changing political opinion. Ac-
cording to Eq. (17), transitions across functional subsystems are triggered jointly by the individual
wealth status of the candidate particle and the average collective one of the population, in such a
way that:
• poor individuals in a poor society (U0 < 0, uh < 0) tend to distrust markedly the government
policy, sticking in the limit at the strongest opposition;
• wealthy individuals in a poor society (U0 < 0, uh ≥ 0) and poor individuals in a wealthy
society (U0 ≥ 0, uh < 0) exhibit, in general, the most random behavior. In fact, they
may trust the government policy either because of their own wealthiness, regardless of the
possibly poor general condition, or because of the collective affluence, in spite of their own
poor economic status. On the other hand, they may also distrust the government policy
either because of the poor general condition, in spite of their individual wealthiness, or
because of their own poor economic status, regardless of the collective affluence;
17
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Figure 5: Asymptotic distributions of active particles over wealth classes and political orientation
for U0 = 0.
• wealthy individuals in a wealthy society (U0 ≥ 0, uh ≥ 0) tend instead to trust earnestly the
government policy, sticking in the limit at the maximum support.
In all cases, transitions are of at most one functional subsystem at a time, i.e., the output state
of the candidate particle is possibly in the higher or lower nearest subsystem.
In spite of a number of possible refinements of the model, some preliminary numerical simula-
tions can be developed toward the main target of this paper. Specifically, we consider again the
two cases corresponding to an economically neutral (U0 = 0) and a poor (U0 = −0.4 < 0) society,
assuming that the political feelings are initially uniformly distributed within the various wealth
classes. The relevant parameters related to welfare dynamics are set as in Section 4.1. Addition-
ally, the basic probability of changing political orientation is set to β = 0.4, and m = 9 functional
subsystems are selected corresponding to as many levels of political support/opposition.
Figure 5, referring to the case U0 = 0, shows that in an economically neutral society with
uniform wealth distribution, such that controlled and uncontrolled welfare dynamics coincide, not
only do wealthy classes stick at an earnest support to the Government policy, but also poor ones
do not completely distrust them, especially in a context of prevalent cooperation among the classes
(γ0 = 3). Therefore, this example does not suggest the development of significant polarization in
that society. On the other hand, Figure 6, corresponding to the case U0 = −0.4, clearly shows a
strong radicalization of the opposition. The model predicts indeed that, in such a poor society,
poor classes stick asymptotically at the strongest opposition, whereas wealthy classes spread over
the whole range of political orientations, however with a mild tendency toward opposition for the
moderately rich ones (say, u5 = 0, u6 = 0.25, and u7 = 0.5). The growth of political aversion is
18
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Figure 6: Asymptotic distributions of active particles over wealth classes and political orientation
for U0 = −0.4.
especially emphasized under uncontrolled welfare dynamics (i.e., variable critical distance γ), when
the marked clustering of the population in the lowest wealth classes, due to a more competitive
spontaneous attitude, entails in turn a clustering in the highest distrust of the regime.
Remark 4. The case studies discussed above indicate that an effective interpretation of the social
phenomena under consideration requires a careful examination of the probability distribution over
the microscopic states. Indeed, Figs. 5, 6 show entirely different scenarios, that might not be
completely caught simply by average macroscopic quantities.
4.3 Looking for early signals of the Black Swan
The simulations presented in the preceding sections have put in evidence that an unfair policy of
welfare distribution can cause a radical surge of opposition to the regime. If this happens, intu-
itive consequences are, for example, strong social conflicts possibly degenerating into revolutions.
Therefore, it is of some practical interest to look for early signals that may precede the occurrence
of this situation.
To begin with, it is worth detailing a little more the expression Black Swan, introduced in the
specialized literature for indicating unpredictable events, which are far away from those generally
observed by repeated empirical evidence. In [44], a Black Swan is specifically characterized as
follows:
“A Black Swan is a highly improbable event with three principal characteristics:
It is unpredictable; it carries a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an
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explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable, than it was.”
and a critical analysis is developed about the failure of the existing mathematical approaches to
address such situations. In the author’s opinion, this is due to the fact that mathematical models
usually rely on what is already known, thus failing to predict what is instead unknown. It is worth
observing that [44] is a rare example of research moving against the main stream of the traditional
approaches, generally focused on well-predictable events. The book [44] had an important impact
on the search of new research perspectives: for instance, it motivated applied mathematicians and
other scholars to propose formal approaches to study the Black Swan, in an attempt to forecast
conditions for its onset. In this context, the following remarks are in order.
• Mathematical models can serve either predictive or exploratory purposes. In the first case,
they predict the evolution in time of the system for fixed initial conditions and parameters;
in other words, they are used to simulate specific real-world situations of interest. In the
second case, instead, they focus on the influence of initial conditions and free parameters
on the overall evolution; namely, they are used to investigate the conditions under which
desired or undesired behaviors may come up.
• A successful modeling approach will eventually provide analytical methods for identifying
the Black Swan, which in turn will be carefully defined in mathematical terms.
• Individual behavioral rules and strategies are not, in most cases, constant in time due to the
evolutionary characteristics of living complex system. Particularly, some parameters of the
models, related to the interactions among the individuals, can change in time depending on
the global state of the system. Such a variability may generate unpredictable events.
• The qualitative analysis of social phenomena cannot be fully understood simply by average
quantities. As already mentioned, the proper detail of mathematical description has to be
retained over the microscopic states of the interacting subjects. Statistical distributions can
serve such a purpose, while not forcing a one-by-one characterization of the agents.
It is plain that the mathematical search of the Black Swan can hardly rely on a purely macroscopic
viewpoint. On the other hand, early signals of upcoming extreme events can be profitably sought
at a macroscopic level, in order for them to be observable, hence recognizable, in practice.
Bearing in mind the previous remarks, we now provide some suggestions for the possible
detection of a Black Swan within our current mathematical framework. The arguments that follow
refer to closed systems in the absence of migrations, so that up to normalization the distribution
functions can be regarded as probability densities.
Let us assume that a specific model, derived from the mathematical structures presented in
Section 3, has a trend to an asymptotic configuration described by stationary distribution functions
{fpasympt}
m
p=1:
lim
t→+∞
‖fpasympt − f
p(t, ·)‖ = 0, p = 1, . . . , m, (18)
where ‖ · ‖ is a suitable norm over the activity u, for instance
‖g‖1,w =
∫
Du
|g(u)|w(u) du for g ∈ L1w(Du), (19)
and w : Du → R+ is a weight function which takes into account the critical ranges of the activity
variable. Equation (19) is written for a continuous activity variable; its counterpart in the discrete
setting is
‖g‖1,w =
n∑
i=1
|g(ui)|w(ui),
now valid for g, w ∈ C0(Du). Alternative metrics can also be introduced depending on the
phenomenology of the system at hand, which may need, for instance, either uniform or averaged
ways of measuring the distance between different configurations.
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Figure 7: The mapping t 7→ dBS(t) computed in the case studies with variable γ illustrated in
Fig. 6, taking as phenomenological guess the corresponding asymptotic distributions obtained with
constant γ.
In addition, let us assume that the modeled system is expected to exhibit a stationary trend
described by some phenomenologically guessed distribution functions {f˜pasympt}
m
p=1. In principle,
such expected distribution have to be determined heuristically for each specific case study, as we
will see in the following.
Inspired by Eq. (18), we define the following time-evolving distance dBS (the subscript “BS”
standing for Black Swan):
dBS(t) := max
p=1, ...,m
‖f˜pasympt − f
p(t, ·)‖, (20)
which, however, will generally not approach zero as time goes by for the heuristic asymptotic
distribution does not translate the actual trend of the system. Using the terminology introduced
in [39], this function can be possibly regarded as one of the early-warning signals for the emergence
of critical transitions to rare events, because it may highlight the onset of strong deviations from
expectations.
Remark 5. Specific applications may suggest other distances different from (20). For instance,
linear or quadratic moments might be taken into account. We consider that extreme events are
likely to be generated by the interplay of different types of dynamics, a fact that should be reflected
in the choice of appropriate metrics.
It is interesting to examine the time evolution of the distance dBS with reference to the case
study U0 = −0.4 with variable critical distance addressed in Section 4.2. A meaningful choice
of the expected asymptotic distribution is, for both γ0 = 3 and γ0 = 7, the one resulting from
the corresponding dynamics with constant critical distance. Reference is to a situation in which
a government underestimates the role played by free interaction rules, presuming that the actual
dynamics do not differ substantially from those observed under imposed rules. Figure 7 shows
the qualitative trends of the mapping t 7→ dBS(t): an initial decrease of the distance, which
may suggest a convergence to the guessed distribution, hence apparently a confirmation of the
government’s conjecture, is then followed by a sudden increase (notice the singular point in the
graph of dBS) toward a nonzero steady value, which ultimately indicates a deviation from the
expected outcome. Such a turnround is possibly a macroscopic signal that a Black Swan is about
to appear. However, in order to get a complete picture, the average gross information delivered
by dBS(t) has to be supplemented by the detailed knowledge of the probability distribution over
the microscopic states, which is the only one able to properly distinguish between lower (γ0 = 3)
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and higher (γ0 = 7) radicalization of political feelings when welfare dynamics are left to individual
selfishness [1].
5 Critical analysis
In this paper we have considered the problem of modeling complex systems of interacting individ-
uals, focusing in particular on the ability of the models to predict the onset of rare events that
cannot be generally foreseen on the basis of past empirical evidences. The results presented in the
preceding sections are encouraging, yet a critical analysis is necessary in order to understand how
far we still are from the challenging goal of devising suitable mathematical tools for studying the
emergence of highly improbable events. We feel confident that a first step is that direction has
been made in this paper. On the other hand, we do not naively pretend that the ultimate target
has been met. With the aim of contributing to further improvements, we propose in the following
some considerations about specific problems selected according to our scientific bias. Hopefully,
this selection addresses key issues of the theory.
Mathematical tools for complex systems The leading idea of the present paper is that
the modeling approach to socio-economic and political systems, where individual behaviors can
play a relevant role on the collective dynamics, needs to consider the latter as living complex
systems. This implies characterizing them in terms of qualitative complexity issues proper of
Social Sciences (cf. Section 2), that have then to be translated in the mathematical language. The
mathematical tools presented in the preceding sections are potentially able to capture such issues,
taking advantage of a procedure of complexity reduction in modeling heterogeneous behaviors and
expression of strategies. Yet, no matter how promising this approach may appear, we are not
pretending that it is sufficient “as-is” for chasing the Black Swan. Instead, models such as those
reported in Section 4 can provide a detailed analysis of events whose broad dynamics are rather
well understood. Furthermore, simulations contribute to put in evidence the role of some key
parameters and can indicate how to devise external actions in order to eventually obtain a specific
behavior of the society under consideration.
Modeling interplays toward the Black Swan Based on the preliminary results that we have
obtained, we believe that rare events can only be generated by several concomitant causes. In this
paper we have addressed the interplay between welfare dynamics and the level of consent/dissent
to the policies of a government, with the aim of detecting the onset of the opposition to a certain
regime. Numerical simulations have indicated that a strong opposition can result from specific
conditions, such as a poor average wealth status administered under a welfare policy leaving
freely to the market the rules of cooperation and competition, without any action by the central
government. On the other hand, the social dissent is attenuated if the government has some
control on the welfare dynamics, for instance if it is able to keep an acceptable level of cooperation
within the population in spite of the spontaneous competitive behavior induced by the poor
collective condition. Of course, the investigation can be further refined by taking into account
additional causes. According to the methodological approach proposed in this paper, the latter
imply partitioning the population in additional functional subsystems.
A naive interpretation of the recent events in North Africa The contents and findings
of the present work inspire some considerations, no matter how naive they may appear, about
the recent conflicts in North Africa countries. First of all, we notice that the latter feature all
issues which, according to Taleb’s definition [44], characterize a Black Swan. Such events were
indeed not expected, but their social impact has been definitely important. Furthermore, once
they happened it actually seemed that they could have been foreseen, for instance it was argued
that a wiser political management of welfare would have limited, or even avoided, their occurrence.
Coming to the conceivable predictive ability of the mathematical approach presented in this paper,
we remark that the dynamics just recalled are indeed accounted for by the models proposed in
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Section 4. Actually, we are well aware that the events we are reasoning upon were generated by
numerous concomitant causes other than simply welfare dynamics. Therefore, while not claiming
to have exhaustively tackled them, we hope to have provided a significant contribution to the
problem of detecting early signals for such critical events.
Further generalizations of the model The modeling approach can be generalized for in-
stance by considering the case of open systems, in which external actions can significantly modify
both individual and collective system dynamics. Analytical properties of formal mathematical
structures, which may be profitably employed to address such issues, have been studied in [11],
however models specifically targeted at real-world problems are not yet available. Other inter-
esting applications concern the case of several interacting societies, for example the study of how
and when a domino effect, like the one recently observed in the aforesaid North Africa countries,
can arise. Even more challenging appears to be the generalization of the model to large social
networks [14, 47]. Recent studies, among others [15, 36], indicate that the role and structure of the
networks can act as additional inputs for determining the predominance of either cooperation or
competition. However, exploring this issue requires a substantial development of the mathematical
structures presented in this paper.
Analytical problems The qualitative analysis of models of the kind presented in this paper
generates interesting analytical problems. As a matter of fact, showing the existence and unique-
ness of solutions to the initial value problem is not a difficult task, because one can exploit the
conservation of the total number of individuals and of their average wealth status. For linearly
additive interactions the proof can be obtained by a simple application of fixed point theorems in a
suitable Banach space, see [9]; the generalization to nonlinearly additive interactions has been re-
cently proposed in the already cited paper [11]. Far more challenging is the analysis, for arbitrary
numbers of wealth classes and functional subsystems, of existence and stability of asymptotic con-
figurations, which are at the core of the practical implications of the model. Simulations suggest
that, for a given initial condition, the system reaches a unique asymptotic configuration in quite
a broad range of parameters, but the existing literature still lacks precise analytical results able
to confirm or reject such a conjecture. Some preliminary insights, however confined to linearly
additive interactions, can be found in [9], that hopefully may serve as a starting point for more
general proofs.
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